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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
STODDARD v. STATE: WHEN DECIDING IF AN IMPLIED 
ASSERTION IS HEARSAY, THE INTENT OF THE 
DECLARANT IS IRRELEVANT IF THE STATEMENT IS 
OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER 
ASSERTED 
By: Lee Wheeler 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that the intentions of the declarant are irrelevant when considering the 
admissibility of an implied assertion. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 
887 A.2d 564 (2005). The Court determined that a declarant's lack of 
intent to communicate a particular belief does not increase the 
reliability of the declarant's words, thus it remains inadmissible 
hearsay. 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Erik Stoddard ("Stoddard") 
was convicted of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in 
death. Jennifer Pritchett ("Pritchett"), Stoddard's girlfriend at the 
time, was the mother of the eighteen-month old victim. Pritchett 
testified at trial that her older daughter came to her one evening after 
the killing and asked, "Is Erik going to get me?" The Defendant 
objected to this portion of the mother's testimony arguing it was 
inadmissible hearsay. 
At trial, the state argued that the child's question was not hearsay 
because it was a question being offered to demonstrate that the child 
feared the Defendant and it was not being offered to prove that the 
child witnessed the Defendant murder the victim. The trial judge 
overruled the Defendant's objections and allowed the testimony into 
evidence. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
determination that the child's statement was not hearsay, reasoning 
that the question, "Is Erik going to get me?" was a non-assertive 
verbal utterance. The intermediate court reasoned that the question 
was not an assertion because it was unintentional and circumstantial 
evidence of the declarant's state of mind, which is nonhearsay under 
Md. Rule 5-801. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address 
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the issue of whether a declarant's intentions are relevant when 
deciding if an implied assertion is hearsay. Stoddard, 389 Md. 681, 
687,887 A.2d 564,567-68. 
The Court began by reviewing the doctrine of implied assertions in 
Maryland. Id. at 688-90, 887 A.2d at 568-70. The Court also defined 
implied assertions as "implications or inferences contained within or 
drawn from an utterance." Id. The Court reviewed the often-cited case 
of Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Ch. 1837), in which a 
will was contested on the basis of incapacity. Stoddard, 389 at 689-
93, 887 A.2d at 570. In Wright, the defendant sought to introduce 
letters written to the testator to prove that the authors of the letters 
believed the testator to be of sound mind. Stoddard, 389 at 691, 887 
A.2d at 570 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488). These letters were 
nonetheless excluded as hearsay because they were offered to show 
that the testator was competent and thus, offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. Id. In Wright, Baron Parke, writing for the court, 
relied on the illustration of a sea captain who was seen inspecting a 
ship and then later embarked on a voyage with his family. Stoddard, 
389 at 691-92, 887 A.2d at 570 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488). 
According to Baron Parke, if the Captain's actions were thought to 
demonstrate the seaworthiness of the ship, it would be hearsay. Id. 
The English court noted in Wright that the intent of the declarant was 
irrelevant as "declarant's intent beliefs communicated accidentally by 
implication are as much 'implied assertions' as beliefs expressed 
purposefully in an indirect manner." Stoddard, 389 Md. at 692-93,887 
A.2d at 571 (citing Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. 488). 
The Court then examined Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) and its 
accompanying Advisory Committee note that distinguishes between 
hearsay and non-hearsay by looking at the intent of the declarant. Id. 
at 693, 887 A.2d at 571. Several jurisdictions have adopted the 
language of the Advisory note while others have held that intent of the 
declarant is irrelevant when considering whether a statement is 
hearsay. Id. at 693-94, 887 A.2d at 571-72. 
The Court continued its analysis by reviewing the corresponding 
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-801. Id. at 695, 887 A.2d at 572-73. 
The Committee note of Maryland Rule 5-801 departs substantially 
from the Advisory note of the Federal Rule. Id. The Committee note 
does not define assertion and states that the definition is best left to the 
development of case law. Id. at 696, 887 A.2d at 572. 
The Court continued by listing the dangers associated with hearsay 
in general and specifically with implied assertions. !d. at 696, 887 
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A.2d at 573. The four hearsay dangers are: sincerity, narration, 
perception, and memory. ld. These dangers arise because the 
statement is made out of court and not under oath or subject to cross-
examination. In tum, the jury does not have the ability to evaluate or 
observe demeanor, circumstances, or other relevant facts that would 
assist it in its evaluation of the declarant's statement. ld. 
As for implied assertions, although the Court stated the danger with 
this type of statement is the risk of insincerity, it noted the other 
hearsay dangers are implicated as well. ld. at 698, 887 A.2d at 574 
(emphasis added). The State used the Advisory Committee note to the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) to support its argument that the 
danger of insincerity is diminished because if a declarant does not 
intend to make an· assertion, then he cannot intend to make a 
misrepresentation. ld. The Court, however, disagreed citing several 
scholars who have examined implied assertions and reliability. ld. at 
698-701,887 A.2d at 574-75. The Court noted the theory of Professor 
Ronald Bacigal who argued that implied assertions are not reliable 
because there is no effort to "avoid ambiguity;" therefore, the 
interpretation of the meaning is inherently umeliable. ld. (citing 
Ronald J. Bacigal, Implied Hearsay: Defusing the Battle Line Between 
Pragmatism and Theory, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1127, 1132 (1987)). The 
Court also cited Professor Michael Graham's theory that the danger of 
insincerity exists with implied assertions because truth of the 
implication itself must be assumed. Stoddard, 389 at 702, 887 A.2d at 
576 (citing Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 
Section 801.7, at 73-77 (5 th ed. 2001)). 
Ultimately, the Court held that the declarant's lack of intent to 
communicate a particular idea through an implied assertion was 
irrelevant to the inquiry of whether or not the assertion was hearsay. 
ld. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577. In making this decision, the Court 
admittedly joined a minority of other jurisdictions in disallowing an 
inquiry into the intentions of a declarant who made an implied 
assertion. ld. 
The Court of Appeals adopted the Third and Sixth Circuit's 
holdings, regarding implied assertions, that an inquiry into the 
intentions of the declarant is unnecessary. fd. at 704-7,887 at 577-79. 
In U.S. v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit 
held that a co-defendant's statement, "I didn't tell them anything about 
you," was hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant was a co-
conspirator in the crime. Stoddard, 389 at 704-5, 887 A.2d at 578. In 
U.s. v. Palma-Ruedas the statement, "nice to meet you," was hearsay 
218 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 36 
when offered to show that the declarant had not previously met the 
listener. 121 F.3d 841, 857 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526 
U.S. 275 (1999) (cited in Stoddard, 389 Md. at 706,887 A.2d at 578-
79). 
The Court of Appeals also cited the Sixth Circuit opinion of Lyle v. 
Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 432-33 (6th Cir. 1983) which held that a letter 
requesting a defendant to give a false alibi for a co-defendant was an 
implied assertion and hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant 
was guilty. Stoddard, 389 Md. at 706, 887 A.2d at 578-79. The Court 
of Appeals also referenced the Iowa Supreme Court, which stated, 
"Implied assertions can be no more reliable than the predicate 
expressed assertion." Stoddard, 389 Md. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577 
(quoting State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Iowa, 2003). 
In the remainder of its decision, the Court determined that the form 
of an assertion, in this case, a question, is not determinative of whether 
or not a statement is hearsay because the declarant "potentially 
communicated a factual proposition." Id. at 710, 887 A.2d at 581-82. 
The Court reasoned that a question could be just as insincere as a 
statement similar in kind. Id. 
In the majority's holding, the Court rejected the idea that a lack of 
intention on the part of a declarant who makes an implied assertion 
reduces the hearsay dangers. In so doing, the Court of Appeals joined 
a minority of jurisdictions and narrowed the admissibility of implied 
assertions. While the Court's holding protects against the dangers of 
hearsay, it further limits the evidence that a jury is allowed to evaluate 
and expands the role of a judge. 
